A powerful feature of linear sketches is that from sketches of two data vectors, one can compute the sketch of the difference between the vectors. This allows us to answer fine-grained questions about the difference between two data sets. In this work, we consider how to achieve this kind of property with sketches that are differentially private. We describe how to compute linear sketches for F0, the number of distinct elements, that can efficiently be made differentially private. Specifically, we consider a sketch that is linear over GF(2), mapping a vector x ∈ {0, 1} u to Hx ∈ {0, 1} τ for a matrix H sampled from a suitable distribution H. Differential privacy is achieved by using randomized response, flipping each bit of Hx with probability p < 1/2. That is, for a vector ϕ ∈ {0, 1} τ where Pr[(ϕ)j = 1] = p independently for each entry j, we consider the noisy sketch Hx + ϕ, where the addition of noise happens over GF(2). We show that for every choice of 0 < β, ε < 1 there exists p < 1/2 and a distribution H of linear sketches of size τ = O(log 4 (u)ε −2 β −2 ) such that:
Introduction
To motivate our work, suppose that the company Acme Corporation runs an employee satisfaction survey once a year. Management at Acme Corporation made some drastic changes over the past year, and they now wish to know how much impact these changes made on the employees' satisfaction. The satisfaction survey is run by a consultant who delivers a summary of the results to the management at Acme Corporation. The consultant ensures that the summary is private, so the individual employees cannot be identified from the summary. The management at Acme Corporation can now combine the summary from last year's survey with the summary from this year's survey to get an estimate of the number of employees who changed their opinion over the past year. We note that the choice of the consultant is allowed to change from year to year, but the summaries should be generated in the same way.
More formally, we consider two players that hold sets A and B, respectively, and the goal is to estimate the size of the symmetric difference |A△B|, in a differentially private manner (see Section 3.2 for the basics of differential privacy). We may think of the sets as two lists of employees. Given input sets A and B, the two players each compute a linear sketch of their own set and add noise to obtain privacy. These noisy sketches can be thought of as the summaries. We refer to [CGHJ12] for an introduction to (linear) sketches.
For input sets A and B, we note that if we along with the estimate of the size of the symmetric difference have estimates of |A| and |B|, then we can also estimate |A ∪ B|, |A ∩ B|, |A\B| and |B\A| as argued in Section 4.3. To make this possible, each player also outputs a differentially private version of their set size.
We show how to construct a linear sketch over GF(2), the field of size 2, which is combined with randomized response [War65] with noise parameter p(ε), to get an ε-differentially private sketch. We show that the noisy sketch still achieves accurate estimates for the symmetric difference with high probability. In a nutshell, we show that linear sketching is sufficiently robust to still get good estimates, even when adding noise to ensure differential privacy. Henceforth, we leave out ε in the noise parameter and write simply p, but keep in mind that p is a function of the privacy parameter ε. We also note that our sketch can be computed and stored for future use, meaning that the players do not have to be active simultaneously but can compute and publish their own sketches when they are ready. Our linear sketch combines a method of Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Rabani [KOR98] with a standard hashing-based subsampling technique (see e.g., [Woo14] ). Hence, we name it the KOR sketch and refer to its noisy counterpart as noisy KOR sketch.
Previously, for example in [SNY17, vVT19], non-linear sketches such as FM-sketches and Bloom filters have been used to privately estimate the size of the union of sets. Such non-linear sketches cannot be directly combined to obtain a sketch for the symmetric difference. Instead, it is necessary to first estimate the size of the union of the input sets and use this together with the size of each input set to estimate the size of the symmetric difference. Our sketch achieves smaller error as we compute an estimate for the size of the symmetric difference directly.
We next give an intuitive description of our techniques, discussed in depth in Section 4. Let U = {1, ..., u} be the universe from which the sets are taken. Privacy parameter ε and accuracy parameter β are given, and a sketch size τ is determined by these parameters. We show in Section 5.2 that we can construct an εdifferentially private sketch from which we can compute a (1+β)-approximation for the size of the symmetric difference with high probability.
A sketch is the concatenation of several partial sketches for different subsamples of the input set. In particular, we compute log(u) partial sketches of size n, where for partial sketch i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 we sample each element of U (and thus the input set) with probability 1/2 i+1 . We will refer to the ith partial sketch as the level-i sketch. A publicly known hash function h : U → [n] is chosen uniformly at random, and used to hash each level-i subsample into the level-i sketch. We note that h is the same for every level. Each level-i sketch is over GF(2) and can be represented as a binary vector of length n.
Randomized response [War65] is applied to the entire sketch, meaning that each entry is flipped with a certain probability p < 1/2. We show in Section 5.1 how to choose p as a function of ε to ensure ε/ log(u)differential privacy for each level-i sketch, and hence ε-differential privacy for the sketch consisting of log(u) concatenated level-i sketches (henceforth referred to as the KOR sketch). Our main theorem is:
Theorem 1 (Noisy KOR sketch). For every choice of 0 < β, ε < 1 there exists a distribution H over GF(2)linear sketches mapping a vector {0, 1} u to {0, 1} τ , where τ = O(log 4 (u)ε −2 β −2 ), and a distribution N ε over noise vectors such that:
1. For H ∼ H and ϕ ∼ N ε , given Hx + ϕ we can compute, in time O(τ ), an estimatem of x 0 that with high probability satisfies |m − x 0 | < β x 0 + O(log 3 (u)ε −2 β −2 ). 
For every
In Section 5.2 we use this in conjunction with Theorem 1 to establish:
Corollary 1. For accuracy parameter β > 0, consider an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for a set A and an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for a set B, based on the same linear sketch H ∼ H, sampled independently of A and B. We can compute an approximation∆ of the size of the symmetric difference, such that with probability 1 − 1/u:
Another application is pan-private F 0 estimation for insertion-only streams [DNP + 10]. Since our sketch works over GF(2) a small trick is needed to avoid cancellation of elements that are inserted an even number of times: Simply put each element seen in the stream into the sketch with probability 1/2. By concentration, very close to half of the elements will be selected an odd number of times, contributing to the F 0 estimate. Thus, multiplying the estimate obtained by a factor of 2 will yield a good estimate of the unsampled set.
Related work
In the absence of privacy constraints, seminal estimators for set cardinality that support merging sketches (to produce a sketch of the union) are FM-sketches [FM85] and bottom-k (aka. k-minimum values) sketches [BYJK + 02]. Progress on making these estimators private for set operations include [TS13] (using FM-sketches) and [STS18], which builds a private cardinality estimator to estimate set intersection size using the bottom-k sketch. We note that these sketches do not achieve differential privacy, but are aimed at a weaker notion of privacy. Specifically, they offer a one-sided guarantee that may reveal that an individual element is not present in the dataset.
Differentially private cardinality estimators Already the seminal paper on pan-privacy [DNP + 10] discusses differentially private streaming algorithms for F 0 on insertion-only streams. The technique used is not a linear sketch, and does not allow deletions or subtraction of sketches. Recent work by von Voigt et al.
[vVT19] has shown how to estimate the cardinality of a set using less space in a differentially private manner using FM-sketches, using the Probabilistic Counting with Stochastic Averaging (PCSA) technique [FM85] . These sketches can be merged to obtain a sketch for the union of the input set with a slightly higher level of noise. Privacy is achieved by randomly adding ones to the sketch and by only sketching a sample of the input dataset.
There has been much work on cardinality estimation under set operations using Bloom Filters (already implicit in [DNP + 10]). Alaggan et al. [AGMT15] estimated set intersection size by combining a technique for computing similarity between sets, represented by Bloom filters in a differentially private manner, named BLIP (BLoom-then-flIP) filters [AGK12] with a technique for approximating set intersection of two sets based on their Bloom Filter representation [BM03] . We note that [AGK12] achieves privacy by flipping each bit of the Bloom filter with a certain probability, much like the technique we use to get privacy of our sketch. Stanojevic et al.
[SNY17] show how to estimate set intersection, union and symmetric difference for two sets by computing an estimate for the size of the union, and combined with the size of each set, they show how to compute an estimate for the size of the intersection and the symmetric difference. They achieve privacy by flipping each bit with some probability, like in [AGK12] . Also, RAPPOR [EPK14] uses Bloom Filters with a randomized response technique to collect data from users in a differentially private way but is mainly aimed at computing heavy hitters.
Though a bound on the expected worst-case error of privately estimating the size of a symmetric difference |A△B| (as in Corollary 1) is not stated in any of these papers, an upper bound of O( √m ), wherem is an upper bound on the size of the sets, follows from the discussion in [SNY17]. It seems that this magnitude of error is inherent to approaches using Bloom filters since it arises by balancing the error related to the noise and the error related to hash collisions in the Bloom filter.
Most closely related to our work is the paper of Mir et al. [MMNW11] , which presents a way of initializing standard linear sketches for F 0 estimation to make the sketch differentially private. The error bound obtained is similar to ours, but their method is inferior in terms of time complexity. This is because they rely on the exponential mechanism [MT07], which is not computationally efficient. Our method is simpler and computationally efficient. It is not directly comparable to the method of [MMNW11] , though, since our sketch is over GF(2) rather than the integers.
Lower bounds. Desfontaines et al. [DLB19] show that it is not possible to preserve privacy in accurate cardinality estimators that require idempotence, i.e., that adding additional copies of an existing element must not change the sketch. It is a necessary requirement for our sketch to work that we are dealing with a set rather than a multiset (i.e., that there are no "copies" in the input set). They also require that one can merge several sketches without loss in accuracy. Our sketch will have an increase in noise when merging sketches, and thus does not satisfy the requirement for cardinality estimators formulared in [DLB19] .
McGregor et al.
[MMP + 10] showed that in order to estimate the size of the intersection of two sets A and B, based on differentially private sketches of A and B, an additive error of Ω( √ n) is needed in the worst case. The lower bound holds even in an interactive setting where Alice (holding A) and Bob (holding B) can communicate, and we require that the communication transcript is differentially private.
Noisy sketching. In addition to the paper of Mir et al. [MMNW11] , there is some previous work on sketching techniques in the presence of noise. Motivated by applications in learning theory, Awasthi et al. [ABHZ16] considered recovery of a vector based on noisy 1-bit linear measurements. The resistance to noise demonstrated is analogous to what we show for the KOR sketch, but technically quite different since the linear mapping is computed over the reals before a sign operation is applied. If the sketching matrix H itself is secret and randomly chosen from a distribution over matrices with entries in a finite field, very strong privacy guarantees on the sketch Hx can be obtained, while still allowing x 0 to be estimated from Hx with small error [BBM14] . However, the condition that the sketch matrix is secret is a serious limitation for applications such as streaming and distributed cardinality estimation that require H to be stored or shared.
Pan-privacy. It was shown in [DNP + 10] that it is possible to construct a sketch that is pan-private with respect to a single intrusion. However, the space complexity of the sketch described is proportional to u, or alternatively to an upper boundm on the size of the set. Mir et al. [MMNW11] obtained a much smaller space usage, polynomial in β, ε and log u. However, as mentioned above their method is not computationally efficient.
Preliminaries
We let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and let U = [u] be the universe that the datasets are taken from.
For a set A ⊆ U , we let x A denote the characteristic vector for A, defined as
otherwise .
For vector x = (x 1 , ..., x d ) we define x 0 , often called the zero-"norm", as
F 0 denotes the 0 th frequency moment and represents the number of distinct elements in a stream (or a set). Frequency moments are well-known from the streaming literature, see for example [AMS96] . We let m denote the size of the input set of the sketch, and let n denote the size of each level-i sketch so that the size of the noisy KOR sketch is n log u. Note that n is fixed and depends on the privacy parameter ε and the accuracy parameter β.
Finally, we assume that sets and vectors are stored in a sparse representation, such that we can list the non-zero entries in the input vector x in time O( x 0 ).
Hashing-based subsampling
For simplicity we assume access to an oracle representing a random hash function. More precisely, we can sample a fully random hash function and it can be evaluated in constant time. We do not store the hash function as part of our sketch, so the space for our sketch does not include space required for storing the hash function. It is likely possible to replace these hash functions with concrete, efficient hash functions that can be stored in small space, while preserving the asymptotic bounds on accuracy, but in order to focus on privacy aspects we have not pursued this direction. Importantly, the differential privacy of our method holds for any choice of hash function, and does not depend on the random oracle assumption.
To ensure that adding two sketches gives a sketch for the symmetric difference, it is necessary that both players sample the same elements for the level-i sketches. To ensure coordinated sampling, we use a hash function so the same elements from U are sampled by both players. We use the following (standard) subsampling technique: let S be the family of all hash functions from U into {0, 1} 1+log(u) . Let s ∼ S uniformly at random. We sample an element j from the input set at level i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 if and only if s(j) has at least i + 1 leading zeros. We refer the reader to the survey of Woodruff [Woo14] for more details on subsampling.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a statistical property of the behavior of a mechanism [DMNS06] . The guarantee is that an adversary who observes the output of a differentially private mechanism will only obtain negligible information about the presence or absence of a particular item in the input data. Intuitively, a differentially private mechanism is almost insensitive to the presence or absence of a single element, in the sense that the probability of observing a specific result should be almost the same for any two neighboring sets.
In Definition 1, we define differential privacy formally in terms of databases. In our application, the databases are sets, and thus neighboring means that one set is a subset of the other, and their sizes differ by 1.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06] ). For ε ≥ 0, a randomized mechanism is said to be εdifferentially private (or purely differentially private) if for any two neighboring databases, S and T -i.e., databases differing in a single entry -and for all W ⊆ Range(M) it holds that
For ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], a randomized mechanism M is said to be (ε, δ)-differentially private (or approximately differentially private) if for any two neighboring databases, S and T , and for all W ⊆ Range(M) it holds that
We show in section 5.1 that our protocol obtains ε-differential privacy. Our protocol for estimating the size of the symmetric difference works in the local model of differential privacy, where each player adds noise to their own sketch. We note that our sketch would also work in a model where vectors supplied by the users are combined using a black-box multi-party secure aggregation [GXS13, MDC16] . In this setting, only the sketch for the symmetric difference would be released, and thus, only this sketch would need to be differentially private, meaning that less noise is required.
We can use the Laplace mechanism [DR14] to get differentially private estimates of the sizes of the input sets. These estimates can be used together with an estimate for the size of the symmetric difference to compute estimates for the union and the intersection of the two input sets with error that is of the same magnitude as the error for estimating the symmetric difference.
For more details about differential privacy, we refer the reader to, for example, [DR14] .
Techniques

Sketch Description
In this section we describe the noisy KOR sketch in detail. As mentioned, our sketch combines the techniques from [KOR98] with hashing-based subsampling to achieve a sketch that is robust against adding noise -as long as we know how much noise was added. Our sketch is the concatenation of log(u) partial sketches, the level-i sketch for i = 0, . . . , log(u) − 1.
We first give the intuition behind the level-i sketch: Suppose that we have a rough estimatem of x 0 , accurate within a constant factor. Then we can obtain a more precise estimate by sampling (using a hash function) a fraction n/m of the elements, for some parameter n, and computing a KOR sketch [KOR98] of size n for the sampled elements. This gives an approximation of the number of sampled elements, which in turn gives an approximation of x 0 with small relative error. Since we do not know x 0 within a constant factor -especially in the setting where we are interested in the size of the symmetric difference -we use hashing-based subsampling to "try" sampling with probability 2 −i−1 for i = 0, . . . , log(u) − 1, one of which is guaranteed to be close to the desired sampling probability assuming that x 0 > n.
We next define the basic building blocks of our sketch. Let S be the family of all hash functions from U to {0, 1} 1+log(u) . Sample s ∼ S uniformly at random. The hash function s defines a u × u-diagonal matrix S i at each level i, defined by (S i ) j,j = 1, if s(j) has i + 1 leading 0s 0, otherwise .
The matrix-vector product S i x represents the subsample of input vector x at level i. Next, we descrive the sketch of [KOR98] as a linear sketch over GF(2). Let F be the family of all hash functions from universe U into [n], and pick h ∼ F uniformly at random. The hash function h uniquely defines an n × u-matrix K, where
We can now define the level-i sketch as H i = KS i , which is an n × u-matrix over GF(2). By definition:
The KOR sketch is the concatenation of log(u) level-i linear sketches. It can be represented as an n log(u)×umatrix H, formed by stacking the log(u) matrices H i . This means that Hx is the concatenation of the subsampled sketches H i x, for i = 0, . . . , log(u) − 1.
Let N ε be a distribution over vectors from {0, 1} n log(u) , where each entry is 1 independently with probability p = 1 2 − ε 2 log(u) . Sample the noise (or pertubation) vector ϕ ∼ N ε independently and uniformly at random. The noisy KOR sketch of x is then computed (over GF(2)) as:
Hx + ϕ.
Estimation
Next, we describe how to compute a cardinality estimate from a sketch Hx + ϕ. To compute an estimate for x 0 , count the number Z i of 1s in each subsampled sketch H i x, and for each i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 compute the interval:
.
Then compute the intersection I = log(u)−1 i=0 I i and check if the maximum value in I is within a factor (1 + β) of the minimum value in I. If that is the case, every element in I is a good estimate for x 0 (having relative error at most 1 + β) with high probability. Otherwise, x 0 is small with high probability, and we let the estimate for x 0 be 0. We will analyze the accuracy of this estimator in Section 5.
Application to symmetric difference
In this section we describe a differentially private protocol to compute an estimate for the size of the symmetric difference between sets held by two parties. First show that the sum of two noisy KOR sketches, Hx A + ϕ and Hx B + ψ, is a noisy KOR sketch for the symmetric difference, H(x A△B ) + (ϕ + ψ), which has the same properties as Hx A + ϕ and Hx B + ψ, but for ε ′ < ε as more noise is added.
Lemma 1. Adding two noisy KOR sketches with pertubation vectors ϕ ∼ N ε and ψ ∼ N ε , respectively, will yield a noisy KOR sketch for the symmetric difference of the input sets with noise ϕ + ψ ∼ N ε ′ for ε ′ = ε 2 / log(u).
Proof. Let x A and x B be the input vectors from each of the two players. Let H be as defined in Section 4, and define ϕ, ψ as the noise vectors for the noisy KOR sketches for x A and x B , respectively. We have (over GF(2)) that
This is exactly the noisy KOR sketch for the symmetric difference with perturbation ϕ + ψ. Note that we observe a 1 in an entry of ϕ + ψ with probability p ′ = p(1 − p) + (1 − p)p = 2p(1 − p). We show in Section 5.1 that we can let p = 1 2 − ε 2 log(u) . Observe that
which implies that ε ′ = ε 2 / log(u).
By Lemma 1 we can treat a sketch for the symmetric difference exactly like a sketch for input vector x although with a different privacy parameter ε ′ . Hence, Theorem 1 gives us Corollary 1, restated here for convenience:
Corollary 1. For accuracy parameter β > 0, consider an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for a set A and an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for a set B, based on the same linear sketch H ∼ H, sampled independently of A and B. We can compute an approximation∆ of the size of the symmetric difference, such that with probability 1 − 1/u: ||A△B| −∆| < β|A△B| + poly(1/ε, 1/β, log u) .
Note that the additive error in Corollary 1 still depends polynomially on ε even for privacy parameter ε ′ , which is explained by the fact that ε ′ = ε 2 / log(u).
Finally, we assumed that |A| and |B| were released with Laplacian noise, which gives an expected additive error of O(1/ε) for each of |A| and |B| [Vad17]. We can use the following equations to get estimates for the union, intersection and difference:
That is, the error is bounded by half the error of the estimate of the symmetric difference size plus O(1/ε).
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we give a proof of Theorem 1, restated here for convenience:
Theorem 1 (Noisy KOR sketch). 
Noise level and Differential Privacy Guarantees
We will consider each noisy level-i sketch and thus introduce notation for the noise vector at level i. Let ϕ i be an n-dimensional (binary) randomness vector, where we restrict the n log(u)-dimensional randomness vectors ϕ ∼ N ε to the entries corresponding to the i th level. We can think of ϕ as the concatenation of log(u) n-dimensional randomness vectors ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ log(u) . We first show that the noisy level-i sketch H i x + ϕ i satisfies ε/ log(u)-differential privacy for each i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1. This implies that the concatenation of all log(u) level-i sketches achieves ε-differential privacy, which proves part 2 of Theorem 1.
Proof. Fix i and let A and B be two neighboring input sets with corresponding characteristic vectors, x A and x B , where neighboring means that one set is a subset of the other and the sizes differ by 1. By symmetry of differential privacy, we can without loss of generality assume that A is the smaller set. Assume that B\{z} = A, so z is the single element that appears in B but not in A. We note that if z is not sampled, that is, if s(z) has less than i leading zeros, then z will not contribute to H i x B and so the sketches are identical which trivially implies differential privacy. Note that z might still contribute to H j x B for j < i. Hence, we assume that z is sampled at level i.
Note that inserting z into the sketch implies that H i x A and H i x B will differ in exactly one entry, i.e., H i x A + H i x B 0 = 1. Fix a noisy sketch, S i . There exist unique vectors ϕ i and ψ i , such that
The probabilities of randomly drawing exactly these randomness vectors are, respectively:
(1 − p) n−r p r and (1 − p) n−r ′ p r ′ .
Let 0 < ε < 1 be given. By Section 3.2 it is enough to show that for any fixed level-i output sketch,
where the probability is over the randomness in ϕ i and ψ i . We note that the the sketches for A and B are computed using the same H i , so the choice of H i has no impact. Hence, to obtain differential privacy it suffices that
which is satisfied for 1 2 > p ≥ 1 e ε/ log(u) + 1 , since p < 1 2 by assumption. Intuitively, removal/insertion of a single element can change up to log(u) entries in the concatenated sketch -that is, our sketch (over all levels) has sensitivity log(u). Hence, we get the following differential privacy guarantees for the sketch:
Lemma 3. The noisy KOR sketch achieves ε-differential privacy, for p ≥ 1 2 − ε 2 log(u) . Proof. As the noise added to H i x A is independent for each i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1, the log(u) noisy level-i sketches H i x A + ϕ i are independent and so, the proof follows directly from Lemma 2 and Theorem 3.14 in [DR14] and that 1 2 − ε 2 log(u) ≥ 1 e ε/ log(u) +1 .
Bounding accuracy
This section along with Section 5.3 prove the first part of Theorem 1. Let an input vector x be given and define m = x 0 . We will mainly consider each level-i sketch isolated, so let ϕ i be the n-dimensional (binary) randomness vectors as described in Section 5.1. First, we state two useful lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let L i be the number of 1s in H i x, and let Z i be the number of 1s in H i x + ϕ i . We have:
E h∼F , s∼S, ϕi∼Np
(3)
Proof. We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for the proof. that for all i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 simultaneously:
Proof. We refer the reader to Appendix A.2 for the proof.
From equation (3) we obtain an expression for m in terms of E[Z i ]:
Note that m is monotone in E[Z i ], so we can insert the bounds from Lemma 5, to obtain the following interval for m which holds for all i with probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e −γ 2 p 3 n/108 :
First, we consider the case when 1 < n < m. In Lemma 6 we state that if m > n, then with high probability we get an error of at most a factor (1+β) for a well-chosen γ, where γ is a function of the privacy parameter ε, the accuracy parameter β and the size of the universe, u. Specifically, we choose γ such that if m ∈ I i (p) for all i, then there is a level, i, such that any value from I i (p) is an estimate of m with at most a multiplicative error of (1 + β). The observation is that we can bound the size of the interval by restricting ourselves to a single choice of i and choose γ depending on that i. We use the i where 1 ≤ m/(2 i n) ≤ 2 as this corresponds to requiring that the input set for the level-i sketch has size between n and 2n (we obtain this input size by sampling). We consider the case when m < n in Section 5.3 where we show that in this case, the error is bounded by an additive factor of O(n).
Lemma 6. Assume m > n > 1. With probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e − γ 2 p 3 n 108 there exists an i ∈ {0, ..., log(u) − 1} such that any element from I i (p) is a (1 + β)-approximation to m for
Specifically, the level i where m 2 i n ∈ [1, 2), gives these guarantees. Proof Sketch. We give an informal sketch of the proof and refer the reader to Appendix A.3 for the formal proof. For now, assume that the bounds in Lemma 5 are satisfied. We remove this assumption shortly. By the bounds in Lemma 5, m ∈ I i (p) for all i. We have to pick γ to ensure that the endpoints of I i (p) are sufficiently close together for some i. We aim for the level i where m/(2 i n) ∈ [1, 2). The idea is to use the bounds from Lemma 5 again to compute a slightly bigger interval around m, I + i (p) ⊃ I i (p) whose end points depend on E[Z i ] rather than Z i . Removing the assumption that the bounds in Lemma 5 hold, we simply get a small error probability and conclude that with probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e −γ 2 p 3 n/108 we have m ∈ I + i (p) for all i. The value γ is chosen to ensure that the endpoints of I + i (p) are within a factor (1 + β) of each other at the level i where m/(2 i n) ∈ [1, 2). We formally choose γ in Appendix A.3. Clearly this implies that I i (p) is also sufficiently small for this i, and so any element from I i (p) will be a (1 + β)-approximation to m.
We now let p = 1 2 − ε 2 log(u) and define I i = I i (p) = I i 1 2 − ε 2 log(u) . For the choice of γ described in Lemma 6, we get the interval I i in (1).
Putting things together
In this section we consider the accuracy in the remaining case where m ≤ n. We also analyze the running time. Combining with Section 5.1 this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
We first show a sufficient upper bound on the sketch size τ = n log u. Without loss of generality assume p > 1/4 and let c γ ≥ 2(3 + β)e 2 be a constant. We can without loss of generality assume u > 10 -this will at most increase the failure probability and space by a constant factor. Then we want e − γ 2 p 3 n 108 < e − βε/ log(u) 2(3+β)e 2 2 1/4 3 n 108 = e − β 2 ε 2 n (log(u)cγ ) 2 ·4 3 ·108 < 1 u 2 , as this ensures a failure probability of at most
It is enough to choose
for c ′ γ = 2 · 4 3 · c 2 γ · 108. Hence, the size of the sketch is
We argue about the error: Note that if m > n, then if one of the intervals, I i , is sufficiently small and m ∈ I i for all i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1, then m ∈ I = log(u)−1 i=0 I i and I is also sufficiently small to give the wanted estimate. So by Lemma 6, we can check if the endpoints of I are within a factor at most (1 + β) of each other, and if so, with high probability any value from I is a proper estimate. If I is too big, then with probability 1 − 1 u we have m ≤ n, in which case we set the estimate of m to 0 leading to an additive error of O(n). This means that we get an additive error of at most n = O log 3 (u)β −2 ε −2 , as required.
Finally, we comment on the running times: For the first part of Theorem 1, we note that in order to compute the estimate, we need to count the number of ones in each level-i sketch, compute the intervals I i and their intersection and check if it is sufficiently small. Counting the number of ones in all level-i sketches is the bottleneck and requires time O(τ ). For the second part of Theorem 1, note that we can initialize the randomness vector ϕ in time O(τ ) and we can hash vector x in time O ( x 0 log(u)) assuming that we can iterate over x in time O( x 0 ).
Combining with Lemma 6 and Lemma 3, we have completed the proof of Theorem 1.
[MT07] 
Proof. Let A be the input set with size m. Let v i ∈ Z n ≥0 be a vector such that for each k ∈ [n]
where 0 i ℓ should be interpreted as a bitstring of length log(u) + 1 with i leading 0s. That is, (v i ) k is the number of items from A that were sampled at level i − 1 and hashed to entry k of the sketch. Note that this means that v 0 is the number of elements that have h(j) = k without any sampling. Intuitively this means that each entry in v i contains the number of elements that were inserted into the sketch just before level i.
Observe that for i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 and for each k ∈ [n]
Pr h∼F , s∼S
Recall that (H i x A ) k is the k th entry of the linear level-i sketch for input set A. By the principle of deferred decisions we have: For i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 we have:
Hence Pr h∼F , s∼S
Letting L i = n k=1 (H i x A ) k be the number of ones in the linear level-i sketch, we have E h∼F s∼S
We will similarly compute an expression for E h∼F ,s∼S,ϕi∼Np [Z i ]. Let ϕ i be the restriction of a randomness vector ϕ ∼ N ε to the entries for the i th level. We see that Pr h∼F , s∼S, ϕi∼Np
This shows that E h∼F , s∼S, ϕi∼Np
A.2 Concentration bounds
Lemma 5. Let Z i be the number of 1s in H i x + ϕ i . For any 0 < γ < 1, we have with probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e − γ 2 p 3 n 6 2 ·3 that for all i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 simultaneously:
Before proving Lemma 5, we mention the following lemma: 
where 0 i ℓ should be interpreted as a bitstring of length log(u) + 1 with i leading 0s. That is, (v i ) k is the number of items from x A that were sampled at level i − 1 and hashed to entry k of the sketch. (v 0 ) k denotes the number of elements that hash to entry k without any sampling. We can think of v i as the number of items that are inserted into the sketch just before sampling at level i.
. V i is a sum of negatively associated random variables (for definition and argument see Section 4.1 in [DP09] ), so by Theorem 4.3 in [DP09] , we can use the Hoeffding bound to see that with probability at least 1 − 2e −2nγ ′2 we have for any i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1
k denote the number of ones in the linear sketch. For fixed V i , L i is a sum of independent random variables with (by the principle of deferred decisions)
Furthermore, as L i is a sum of independent random variables for a fixed choice of V i , we can use the Hoeffding bound: with probability at least 1 − 2e −2nγ ′2
where L i| Vi=t means the value of L i when we assume that V i = t. Combining this with (5) and (6) a union bound gives with probability at least 1 − 4e −2nγ ′2
Simultaneously, (5) and (6) gives
which implies
Note that in the union bound from (7), we already assumed that (5) was satisfied, so (9) is trivially satisfied under the union bound without changing the probability guarantees. Hence, inserting (9) into (7), we have
which finally shows that with probability at least 1 − 4e −2nγ ′2 we have
A union bound over the log(u) values of i concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix i. Let L i = H i x A 0 denote the number of ones in the linear level-i sketch and similarly Z i = H i x A + ϕ i 0 the number of ones in the noisy level-i sketch. We let Z i| Li=t mean the number of ones in the noisy sketch, under the assumption that we observe t ones in the linear sketch. For any fixed value t ∈ {0, ..., n} of L i , we have E ϕi∼Np Z i| Li=t = (1 − p) · t + p(n − t) = np + (1 − 2p)t.
By Lemma 7, with probability at least 1 − 4 log(u)e −2γ ′2 n we have for all i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1
Furthermore, for any fixed H i , let Z i| Hi denote the number of ones in the noisy level-i sketch, conditioned on this choice of H i . We note that fixing H i is equivalent to fixing L i as L i is uniquely determined by H i and the input. Z i| Hi is a sum of independent random variables, where the randomness comes from the perturbation. So for any 0 < γ * < 1, a Chernoff bound gives
where E Z i| Hi is over ϕ i ∼ N p . By (11), E ϕi∼Np Z i| Hi ≥ np for any choice of H i , so 2e −γ * 2 pn/3 is an upper bound on (13). Moreover, (13) holds for all i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 simultaneously with probability at most 2 log(u)e −γ * 2 pn/3 . We conclude that 
By Lemma 4, this is equivalent to
(
We pick a suitable γ ′ :
Hence, let γ ′ = γp 6 . Inserting into (15) we have
where E[Z i ] is over h ∼ F , s ∼ S and ϕ i ∼ N p .
We conclude that with this choice of γ, with probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e − γ 2 p 3 n 6 2 ·3
(1 − γ) E h∼F , s∼S, ϕi∼Np
A.3 Size of interval for input size Lemma 6. Assume m > n > 1. With probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e − γ 2 p 3 n 108 there exists an i ∈ {0, ..., log(u) − 1} such that any element from I i (p) is a (1 + β)-approximation to m for γ = β(1 − 2p) 2(3 + β)e 2 .
